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A corporate leniency program provides relief from government penalties to
the ﬁrst member of a cartel to come forward and cooperate with the authorities.
This study explores the incentives to apply for leniency when each cartel member
has private information as to the likelihood that the competition authority will be
able to convict them without a cooperating ﬁrm. A ﬁrm may apply for leniency
because it fears being convicted ("prosecution eﬀect") or because it fears another
ﬁrm will apply ("pre-emption eﬀect"). Policies by the competition authority to
magnify concerns about pre-emption - and thereby induce greater use of the
leniency program - are also explored.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
One of the most important policy developments in U.S. antitrust policy in recent
decades is the 1993 revision of the Corporate Leniency Program by the Department of
Justice (DOJ). This program allows corporations, who are engaging in illegal antitrust
activity (such as price-ﬁxing), to receive amnesty from government penalties if they
come forward and cooperate. The appeal of such incentives for discovering cartels and
acquiring the evidence to eﬀectively prosecute has resulted in more than 50 countries
and jurisdictions having adopted some form of a corporate leniency program.
In light of the importance of leniency programs in practice, there has been a
considerable amount of research exploring how leniency programs aﬀect the incentives
∗I very much appreciate the comments and suggestions of Faruk Gul, Martin Peitz, seminar
participants at the U. of Copenhagen, and conference participants at CRESSE 2011 (Rhodes, Greece),
and the research assistance of Weining Bao.
1to collude and to report cartels.1 Beginning with the pioneering paper of Motta
and Polo (2003), the primary force in theoretical analyses is that the competition
authority may catch the colluding ﬁrms and, in anticipation of that prospect, ﬁrms
may apply for leniency; this I will refer to as the prosecution eﬀect. For example,
in Harrington (2008a), the probability of the competition authority discovering and
successfully prosecuting the cartel varies over time and, when it is suﬃciently high,
collusion collapses and all ﬁrms race for leniency. While the threat of the competition
authority catching the cartel is indeed critical, there is another ﬁrst-order eﬀect which
is absent in previous analyses. Referring to it as the pre-emption eﬀect, this is when
a ﬁrm - which doesn’t necessarily believe the competition authority is likely to catch
the cartel - is still concerned that another cartel member may apply for leniency and,
because of that concern, applies itself. Indeed, in practice, it is typical that one ﬁrm
pre—empts its rivals by applying for leniency, as opposed to multiple ﬁrms racing for
leniency. This outcome - whereby a single ﬁrm turns in its fellow colluders - runs
contrary to the prediction of all previous models which is that either all or no ﬁrms
apply.
The objective of this paper is to develop and explore a model that encompasses
the pre-emption eﬀect in order to both better understand the incentives of ﬁrms
in an environment with a leniency program and to investigate how the competition
authority can manipulate those incentives through ancillary instruments in order to
make a leniency program more eﬀective. Obviously, the key modelling modiﬁcation is
to allow cartel members to have private information regarding the likelihood that the
competition authority may be able to eﬀectively prosecute them. As the introduction
of private information is a substantive complication, I explore its role in the post-
cartel environment; that is, the cartel has collapsed for internal reasons and the
objective of each ﬁrm is to minimize its expected penalties. Future work will consider
embedding this setting into an inﬁnitely repeated game so that the impact of the
leniency program on the stability of collusion can be formally explored.
As current intuition regarding the incentive eﬀects of leniency programs is predi-
cated upon ﬁrms having common information, I begin by comparing equilibria with
private information to equilibria when there is public information. That analysis
identiﬁes and investigates the prosecution and pre-emption eﬀects. Whether leniency
usage and the frequency of conviction is more or less likely with private signals, com-
pared to when signals are public, depends on the details of the leniency program.
When leniency is suﬃciently generous (that is, a high fraction of ﬁnes are waived),
ﬁrms are more likely to apply when they have private signals; however, that need not
be the case when leniency is stingy. More interestingly, if enough ﬁnes are waived
with leniency, ﬁrms apply for leniency for sure with private signals. Even if the pros-
ecution eﬀect is very weak (that is, a ﬁrm believes the competition authority’s case
1For example, theoretical research includes Motta and Polo (2003), Spagnolo (2003), Aubert, Rey,
and Kovacic (2006), Chen and Harrington (2007), Chen and Rey (2007), Harrington (2008a), and
Choi and Gerlach (2010); experimental research includes Apesteguia et al, (2007), Hinloopen and
Soetevant (2008), and Bigoni et al (2010); and empirical research includes Brenner (2009), Miller
(2009), Klein (2010), and Zhou (2010). For a review of some of the research on leniency programs,
see Spagnolo (2008).
2is unlikely to be adequate to convict), it will still apply for leniency out of concern
that its rival will apply. In comparison, when there are public signals, ﬁrms do not
apply when the prosecution eﬀect is very weak. It is also shown, using numerical
analysis, that a more aggressive competition authority can have a signiﬁcant eﬀect
on the probability of conviction through the manner in which the prosecution and
pre-emption eﬀects interact. A more aggressive competition authority enhances the
prosecution eﬀect which makes ﬁrms more likely to apply for leniency. In addition,
the prospect of a ﬁrm’s rival being more likely to apply for leniency (because of the
prosecution eﬀect) then makes a ﬁrm yet more likely to apply (pre-emption eﬀect)
which then makes its rival yet more likely and so forth. Thus, a rise in the prosecution
eﬀect is magniﬁed by the pre-emption eﬀect so there is a big return in terms of a rise
in the probability of securing a conviction.
After describing the model in Section 2, the theoretical literature on leniency
programs is reviewed in Section 3 as it pertains to the issue of information. Equilibria
are characterized in Section 4 with a comparison of the cases of public and private
information in Section 5. I then analyze the eﬀects of a more aggressive competition
authority when it comes to discovering and prosecuting cartels (Section 6). Section
7 concludes.
2G e n e r a l M o d e l
Consider a cartel composed of two ﬁrms for which collusion has ended and ﬁrms are
independently deciding whether or not to apply for leniency. If a ﬁrm is convicted
without having received leniency, it pays a ﬁne 0; while if it receives leniency
then its ﬁne is  where  ∈ [01),s om o r el e n i e n c yi sa s s o c i a t e dw i t hal o w e rv a l u e
of .Aﬁrm’s only decision is whether or not to apply for leniency and its objective
is to minimize expected penalties.
Regarding the decision to apply for leniency, a primary source of uncertainty for
a ﬁrm is the likelihood that it’ll be prosecuted and convicted by the competition
authority (CA) when no ﬁrm has cooperated through the leniency program; that is,
enforcement without assistance of the leniency program. Let  denote the probability
of a conviction when no ﬁrm has applied for leniency.  is a random variable from
the perspective of ﬁrms and, prior to making a leniency decision, ﬁrm  receives a
private signal  ∈ [] of . After learning their signals, ﬁrms simultaneously decide
whether or not to apply for leniency. A strategy for a ﬁrm is then of the form:
 :[ ] → {Apply, Do not apply} Though ﬁrm  does not get to observe ﬁrm ’s
signal, it will have some information if  and  are correlated, which will be the
case if both signals are informative with respect to .L e t ( |) be ﬁrm ’s cdf
on ﬁrm ’s signal conditional on its own signal,  =1 2 and  6= . To capture the
positive correlation between ﬁrms’ signals, assume A1.
A1  ( |) ( 6= )i sc o n t i n u o u s l yd i ﬀerentiable in  and  If 00  0 then
 (·| = 00) weakly ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates (FOSD)  (·| = 0)
3A higher signal for a ﬁrm results in it attaching more probability to high signals for
its rival.
If only one ﬁrm applied for leniency then it pays a penalty of  and the other
ﬁrm pays  (hence, it is assumed conviction occurs for sure because of a cooperating
cartel member). If both ﬁrms apply for leniency then each has an equal chance of




 If no one applied for
leniency then ﬁrms are convicted with probability  and each pays ,w h i c hm e a n s
ﬁrm ’s expectation on its penalty is  [|] where  [|] is its expectation on 
conditional on its signal. It is assumed that:
A2  [|]:[ ] → (01) is continuously diﬀerentiable and increasing in 
In light of preceding research focusing on the case of public signals, Section 4
begins by comparing the incentives between when signals are private and they are
public in order to identify the unique features introduced by allowing ﬁrms to have
private information. To do so, we will also explore a game when ﬁrms’ signals (1 2)
are common knowledge so that, when they simultaneously decide whether or not to
apply for leniency, they have a common expectation  [|1 2] on . For that game,
a ﬁrm’s strategy is then of the form  :[ ]
2 → {Apply, Do not apply}
A3  [|1 2]:[ ] → (01) is continuously diﬀerentiable, responds symmetrically
to 1 and 2, and is increasing in 1 and 2
3 Literature Review
Since the main modelling innovation of this paper is in terms of information, the
literature review will focus on the informational assumptions of previous work and
their implications. The initial class of models examining the eﬀect of a leniency
program on cartel stability modiﬁed the standard inﬁnitely repeated oligopoly game
(usually, the Prisoners’ Dilemma) by assuming that, in each period that ﬁrms are
colluding, there is a ﬁxed probability  that ﬁrms are caught by the CA - in which case
they pay a ﬁxed penalty - and ﬁrms have the option to apply for leniency to receive
reduced penalties. Firms make the leniency decision simultaneously and models diﬀer
in terms of whether it occurs after the current period’s prices are revealed (e.g., Motta
and Polo, 2003) or a ﬁrm makes its price and leniency decisions simultaneously, in
which case it can simultaneously undercut the collusive price and apply for leniency
(e.g., Harrington and Chang, 2010).2 With  being ﬁxed and known over time, the
stationarity of the environment implies that if equilibrium involves ﬁrms colluding
then ﬁrms never apply for leniency; if leniency is used as part of an equilibrium then,
given stationarity, it occurs in the ﬁrst period but if conviction prevents reformation
of the cartel (for a suﬃciently long time) then ﬁrms would cheat in the initial period
(as they anticipate collusion ending because a ﬁrm applied for leniency) which then
2Bigoni et al (2010) conducts experiments and allow subjects both to apply for leniency when
setting its price or, in the event that no ﬁrm has applied for leniency, to apply after prices are revealed
and ﬁr m sl e a r nw h e t h e ro rn o tt h e r ew a sad e v i a t i o n .
4makes collusion unstable. In brief, a ﬁxed and known value for  implies that leniency
is not used in equilibrium.3
In practice, ﬁrms do form a cartel and then, at some point in time, apply for
leniency. This can occur if the environment changes so that it was initially optimal for
ﬁrms to collude and not apply for leniency, and at some later time it becomes optimal
to apply. This possibility is explored in Harrington (2008a) where it is assumed  is
not ﬁxed - it is  over time - but the assumption that  is public information among
ﬁrms is maintained. A Pareto-eﬃcient equilibrium is now characterized by a cut-oﬀ
value for  such that if  exceeds that cut-oﬀ then ﬁrms stop colluding and all apply
for leniency - because the prospects of being caught by the CA are suﬃciently great
so as to cause the cartel to collapse - and otherwise ﬁrms collude and do not apply.4
There have been some recent analyses to allow for private information in ways
distinct from how it is modelled here. Silbye (2010b) assumes  is common knowledge
but each ﬁrm possesses evidence that it could submit to convict the other ﬁrm if it
applied for leniency.  ∈ [01 − ] is the evidence possessed by ﬁrm  to assist in
convicting ﬁrm  and is private information to ﬁrm .I fﬁrm  receives leniency then
ﬁrm ’s expected penalty is ( + ). If no one applies then each has an expected
ﬁne of , which, as noted, is common knowledge. Sauvagnat (2010) allows the CA
to have private information about the strength of its case and it is a strategic decision
whether to open an investigation. (Previous work implicitly allowed for such private
information but assumed the start of an investigation was exogenous.) Of particular
r e l e v a n c ei st h a tt h eC Am a yo p e na ni n v e s t i g a t i o ne v e nw h e ni t sc a s ei sw e a k ,a s
doing so may induce ﬁrms to apply for leniency. Finally, Pinna (2010) considers the
strategic choice of competition policy when the ﬁrms know whether or not they are
colluding but the CA does not.
4 Characterization of Equilibrium
4.1 Public Signals
To appreciate the new forces introduced with private information, let us begin by
characterizing equilibrium when ﬁrms’ signals (1 2) are public information. First
note that there are only symmetric equilibria since applying for leniency is optimal






Apply if (1 2)  ∈ Ω
Do not apply if (1 2) ∈ Ω
(1)
3There is also an equilibrium in Motta and Polo (2003) - referred to as "collude and report" -
for which ﬁrms collude and apply for leniency in every period. This occurs when the cartel can
immediately reform and leniency is suﬃciently generous. Though it canb ea ne q u i l i b r i u m ,i tw o u l d
not seem to be an empirically relevant solution.
4Harrington (2008a) also considers a policy space for which amnesty is awarded if and only if 
is suﬃciently low (i.e., the competition authority’s case is not too strong). Silbye (2010a) enriches
the policy space to when the amount of leniency can depend continuously on 
5where
 [|1 2] ≤  ∀ (1 2) ∈ Ω (2)
If (1 2)  ∈ Ω,s ot h a taﬁrm’s rival is going to apply for leniency, it is optimal for a




 is preferred to a sure penalty
of .N o w c o n s i d e r (1 2) ∈ Ω so that a ﬁrm’s rival is not expected to apply for
leniency. If a ﬁrm does not apply as well then its expected penalty is  [|1 2]
while it is  from applying. Hence, not applying is optimal if and only if (iﬀ)
 [|1 2] ≤ .A sl o n ga s
[|1 =  2 = ]
so there are some signals for which it is an equilibrium for both not to apply, there
are an inﬁnite number of equilibria as there are an inﬁnite number of sets Ω satisfying
(2).
Notice that if (1 2)  ∈ Ω and  [|1 2] then ﬁrms are incurring higher
penalties by both applying for leniency than if both did not, as






where the term to the left of the ﬁrst inequality is the expected penalties from both
not applying and the term to the right of the second inequality is from both applying.
This makes it useful to deﬁne the Pareto-eﬃcient equilibrium,
Ω∗ ≡ {(1 2): [|1 2] ≤ }
which has ﬁrms not apply whenever it is an equilibrium. This equilibrium minimizes





expected penalties are higher with both applying compared to both not applying but
it is not an equilibrium for both not to apply given those signals.
4.2 Private Signals
Now suppose ﬁrms’ signals are private information, and consider a symmetric strategy





Do not apply if  ∈ []
Apply if  ∈ (]
(3)
A ﬁrm applies for leniency iﬀ its signal exceeds . The set of symmetric cut-oﬀ
Bayes-Nash equilibria can then be characterized by the set of values for  such that
6 is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Given ﬁrm 2 uses this strategy, the expected penalty
to ﬁrm 1 from not applying is
Z 

 [|1 2]0 (2 |1)2 +[ 1−  (|1)]
or
 (|1) [|1 2 ≤ ] +[ 1−  (|1)] (4)
If 2 ≤  then ﬁrm 2’s signal is suﬃciently low that it does not apply in which case
ﬁrm 1’s expected penalty from not applying is its expectation on  multiplied by 
This expectation,  [|1 2 ≤ ], is conditional on ﬁrm 1’s signal and ﬁrm 2 having
a signal that induces it not to apply for leniency. If 2 then ﬁrm 2 applies for
leniency in which case, by not applying, ﬁrm 1 is convicted and pays . If instead
ﬁrm 1 applies for leniency then its expected penalty is






If 2 ≤  then it is the only ﬁrm to apply for leniency so its penalty is ,w h i l e




Firm 1 strictly prefers to apply for leniency iﬀ (4) exceeds (5):
 (|1) [|1 2 ≤ ] +[ 1−  (|1)] (6)






where recall that each ﬁr mi sm a k i n gac h o i c et ominimize expected penalties. This
expression can be re-arranged to









It is optimal to apply for leniency when the expected probability of being caught
by the CA,  [|1 2 ≤ ],i ss u ﬃciently large relative to the leniency parameter .
The relevant expectation on being caught by the CA is for when no one applies for
leniency, which is the expectation on  conditional on a ﬁrm’s own signal and that
its rival’s signal is suﬃciently low that it does not apply for leniency.5
Using (7), deﬁne









5The intuition is analogous to that for auctions when bidders have aﬃliated values. A bidder
selects its bid based on beliefs over the true value when its bid matters for its payoﬀ,w h i c hi sw h e n
its signal is the highest as then its bid is the highest so it wins the item. Analogously, a ﬁrm evaluates
the payoﬀ from not applying for leniency using beliefs as to the likelihood of being caught by the
CA when such beliefs matter, which is when the other ﬁrm’s signal is suﬃciently low that it does
not apply for leniency.
7Given signal 1 and threshold , applying is optimal for ﬁrm 1 iﬀ ∆(1)  0.N e x t
note that leniency becomes relatively more attractive when a ﬁrm’s own signal is
























by A1. Hence, applying for leniency is optimal when 1 iﬀ ∆() ≥ 0 as then
∆(1)  0∀1  Not applying is optimal when 1 iﬀ ∆() ≤ 0 as then










where Γ() ≡  (|) and is the probability that 2 ≤  conditional on 1 = .
In some of the analysis, it’ll be easier to work with Φ() because it is bounded as
 → .H e r ea r es o m es u ﬃcient conditions for equilibrium, with the ﬁrst condition
summarizing the preceding analysis.
• If Φ(0)=0then  = 0 is an equilibrium cut-oﬀ.
•  =  is an equilibrium cut-oﬀ.N o t et h a t










which, by (8), means ∆(1)  0 ∀ 1 and, therefore, applying is strictly
preferred to not applying for all signals. In other words, if a rival is going to
apply for leniency for sure (that is, for every signal) then it is optimal to do so
as well.
• If Φ() ≤ 0 then  =  is an equilibrium cut-oﬀ. Again by (8), ∆(1) ≤ 0 ∀
1   which implies it is never optimal to apply. Thus, not applying for all
signals is an equilibrium if, conditional on the other ﬁrm never applying, a ﬁrm
prefers not to apply even when it receives the strongest signal .
8• If
 [|1 = 2 = ] [|1 = ]





 0 [|1 = ] −  = Φ()
By continuity, ∃0 ∈ () such that Φ(0)=0 .
It will be useful to consider the Pareto-eﬃcient symmetric cut-oﬀ Bayes-Nash
equilibrium which is the equilibrium with the highest threshold  as I will show it
minimizes expected penalties for ﬁrms. Given the other ﬁrm’s threshold is  a ﬁrm
expected penalty from applying for leniency is decreasing in 











and from not applying for leniency is decreasing in 
− {1 −  [|1 2 = ]}0 (|1)  0
For any strategy of this ﬁrm, its expected penalty is lower when the other ﬁrm’s
threshold is higher. Hence, its optimal strategy must result in lower expected penal-
ties when  is higher. Thus, ﬁrms rank equilibria according to the threshold  and
equilibria with higher  are more preferred.
5 Comparison of Equilibria with Public and Private Sig-
nals
With public signals and assuming the other ﬁrm does not apply for leniency, a ﬁrm
prefers to apply iﬀ
 [|1 2] − 0 (9)
Focusing on the Pareto-eﬃcient equilibrium, leniency is used only when the likelihood
attached to the CA prosecuting and convicting them is suﬃc i e n t l yh i g hr e l a t i v et o
the leniency parameter. Behavior is entirely driven by beliefs as to CA behavior.
By comparison, consider the situation when ﬁrms’ signals are private. From (7),
ﬁrm 1 prefers to apply for leniency iﬀ











Prosecution eﬀect Pre-emption eﬀect
(10)
In contrasting, (9) and (10), ﬁrst note that the LHS is diﬀerent, which encompasses
what is referred to as the prosecution eﬀect for it deals with beliefs as to the CA’s
probability of a successful prosecution (without use of the leniency program) relative
9to the leniency parameter. With public signals, the likelihood attached to the CA
levying penalties is based on ﬁrms’ common signals. With private signals, a ﬁrm
doesn’t know its rival’s signal and so its ex p e c t a t i o ni sb a s e do ni t so w ns i g n a la n d
its rival’s signal being suﬃciently low that it chooses not to apply. The relationship
between these two expectations -  [|1 2] and  [|1 2 ≤ ] - is ambiguous.
What is not ambiguous is the relationship between the RHS of these two conditions.
With private signals, a ﬁrm is not assured as to what the other ﬁrm will do. Even if
ﬁrm 1’s signal is very low - suggesting that being caught by the CA is unlikely and
thus ﬁrms should not apply for leniency (that is, the prosecution eﬀect is weak) - it
realizes that ﬁrm 2’s signal could be high in which case it would apply. Note that
1− (|1) is the probability that a rival applies for leniency conditional on a ﬁrm’s
signal in which case the RHS of (10) is lower, the more likely it is that the other ﬁrm
will apply for leniency. This provides a second reason for ﬁrm 1 to apply for leniency,
quite independent of whether it thinks the CA will catch them. It is referred to as
the pre-emption eﬀect because it captures a ﬁrm’s concern with its rival applying for
leniency prior to the ﬁrm itself having information that the CA is a serious threat.
In sum, it is not immediately clear whether information being private makes ﬁrms
more or less inclined to apply for leniency. While the pre-emption eﬀect is present
only with private signals - and clearly serves to enhance the attractiveness of applying
for leniency - whether the prosecution eﬀect is stronger or weaker with private signals
is not determined. To clarify matters, Theorem 1 shows that a suﬃciently generous
leniency program induces ﬁrms to always apply for leniency when they have private
signals. All proofs are in Appendix A.




unique symmetric cut-oﬀ Bayes-Nash equilibrium is for ﬁrms to apply for leniency
for all signals.
No matter how generous is leniency, as long as some penalties are not waived (that
is, 0), it is possible that ﬁrm 1 could receive a suﬃciently weak signal that it
would prefer not to apply for leniency on the basis that the CA is suﬃciently unlikely
to convict; that is,  [|1]  As  gets smaller, the requisite signal for that to be
true must be lower but, at least when  [|1 = ]=0 , such signals exist. Of course,
ﬁrm 1 is also concerned with the prospect of ﬁrm 2 applying and if, by the same
argument, it takes a really weak signal for ﬁrm 2 not to apply then ﬁrm 1 attaches
low probability to that event. That is, even if ﬁr m1 ’ ss i g n a li se x t r e m e l yw e a k ,i t
is very unlikely that ﬁr m2 ’ ss i g n a li sa l s oe x t r e m e l yw e a k .G i v e nt h a tﬁrm 1 then
believes ﬁrm 2 is likely to apply, ﬁrm 1 ﬁnds it optimal to apply as well, regardless of
the signal that ﬁrm 1 receives. The prosecution eﬀect can be very weak but, due to
the strength of the pre-emption eﬀect, ﬁrms apply for leniency. Hence, when leniency
is suﬃciently generous (even though it is not complete) and signals are private, ﬁrms
always apply.
Theorem 1 does not by itself prove that, when leniency is suﬃciently generous,
the program is used more often with private signals than with public signals. It
shows that when  is suﬃciently low, ﬁrms use the leniency program with probability
10one when signals are private. For usage to exceed that when signals are public,
the leniency program must be used with probability less than one when signals are
public which is the case only if [|1 =  2 = ], but then there is the issue
of whether  is low enough for Theorem 1 to apply. This matter is resolved with the
next result.
Theorem 2 There exists 0 such that if
 [|1 =  2 = ] [|1 =  2 = ]+
then the probability of leniency usage and the probability of conviction is higher for
all symmetric cut-oﬀ Bayes-Nash equilibria with private signals than for the Pareto-
eﬃcient symmetric cut-oﬀ equilibrium with public signals.
The next result presumes the condition  [|1 = 2 = ] [|1 = ] which
is quite natural if  [|1 = ]  [] so that the highest signal causes ﬁrms to
increase their expectation on ,a n dﬁrms’ signals are positively but not perfectly
correlated. If leniency is suﬃciently weak -  [|1 = ] - then the Pareto-eﬃcient
equilibrium with private signals is to never apply for leniency because, given the other
ﬁrm never applies, a ﬁrm prefers not to apply even if it receives the strongest signal. If,
in addition, leniency is not too weak - so that [|1 = 2 = ] - then leniency
is used with positive probability in all equilibria when there are public signals; both
ﬁrms receiving the strongest signals induces usage of the program. Under these
conditions, leniency is used more frequently when there are public signals because,
given ﬁrms are initially doubtful about the prospects of being caught, inducing them
to apply for leniency requires enough information to counteract those prior beliefs.
A single signal is inadequate but two signals could be suﬃcient.
Theorem 3 If
 [|1 = ] [|1 = 2 = ]
then the probability of leniency usage and conviction is higher for all symmetric cut-oﬀ
Bayes-Nash equilibria with public signals compared to the Pareto-eﬃcient symmetric
cut-oﬀ Bayes-Nash equilibrium with private signals.
In Harrington (2011), an example is provided which illustrates the main results
of this section. There it is assumed the probability of conviction equals the sum
of the ﬁrms’ signals,  = 1 + 2 where 1 and 2 are independent with a uniform
distribution on [012]. It is shown that the probability of conviction with private
signals is higher (lower) than that with public signals when  715 ( 715). In
fact, conviction can be signiﬁcantly more likely when  is moderately low and is at
most mildly more likely when  is high.
In concluding this section, it is worth noting that these results have some implica-
tions for optimal competition policy. Suppose a CA has some evidence which it can
share with two ﬁrms suspected of having formed a cartel. Does it want to have a pol-
icy of sharing the same evidence with both ﬁrms or instead a policy in which it shares
11diﬀerent parts of the evidence with diﬀerent ﬁrms? To be more speciﬁc, suppose one
batch of evidence is represented by signal 1 and a second batch is represented by
signal 2 The case of public signals is then a policy of sharing all evidence (both
signals) with both ﬁrms, while the case of private signals is a policy of sharing some
evidence with one ﬁrm (signal 1)a n dd i ﬀerent evidence with the other ﬁrm (signal
2). What the preceding analysis suggests is that, as long as the leniency program is
suﬃciently generous, a CA wants to show ﬁrms diﬀerent evidence because, by result-
ing in ﬁrms having private information, a CA can enhance the pre-emption eﬀect and
induce greater use of the leniency program and a higher probability of conviction.
Asymmetric beliefs among ﬁrms is complementary to a generous leniency program.
6 Impact of a More Aggressive Competition Authority
In this section, we explore the impact of a CA being seen as more aggressive in the
sense that ﬁrms initially believe the CA is more likely to discover and successfully
prosecute a cartel. In order to perform this comparative static, the model is simpliﬁed




where 0 ≤    ≤ 1 I will speak of the CA
having either a strong case ( = )o raw e a kc a s e(  = ). Let  be the prior
probability that the CA is strong, and the CA is said to be more aggressive when  is
higher. A CA could be more aggressive by instituting the practice of screening data
for evidence of collusion or having a bigger budget for prosecuting cases.6  (|) is
the density function on a ﬁrm’s signal conditional on the strength of the CA’s case (as






Finally, assume that ﬁrms’ signals are independent conditional on .





 if Φ()  0∀ ∈ []
max{ : Φ()=0 } if ∃ ∈ () s.t. Φ() ≤ 0 and Φ()  0
 if Φ() ≤ 0
where Φ()=Γ()∆() and recall:









Assuming the two-point distribution and conditional independence of signals, it is
derived in Appendix B that:
Γ()=
















 [|1 = 2 ≤ ]=























6The case for screening is presented in Harrington (2007, 2008b).
12The next result shows that a more aggressive CA induces greater usage of the
leniency program. Recall that a ﬁrm applies for leniency iﬀ its signal exceeds ∗.
Theorem 4 If ∗ ∈ () then, generically, ∗
  0
By Theorem 4, a more aggressive CA results in a greater likelihood of a leniency
application coming from a cartel, as the requisite signal to induce a leniency applica-
tion is not as high. To consider its eﬀect on the probability of conviction, ﬁrst note
that this probability equals

h
 +( 1− )
³
















When the CA has a strong case (which occurs with probability ), the CA successfully
convicts with probability  regardless of whether ﬁrms apply for leniency and, in the
event that they do not have the evidence to achieve a guilty verdict (which occurs
with probability 1−), still convict because a ﬁrm applies for leniency, which occurs
with probability 1− (∗ ()|)
2 (which is the probability at least one ﬁrm receives a
signal exceeding ∗). There is an analogous description when, with probability 1−,
the CA has a weak case.
In order to assess the eﬀect of a more aggressive CA, take the derivative of the































The ﬁrst bracketed term is positive because 1−  1− and that a higher value for 





¢2 ≥  (∗ ()|)
2  That expression captures
the direct eﬀect from a more aggressive CA in that it is more likely to have a strong
case and thus more likely to get a conviction, either because it has the evidence to
achieve a guilty plea or it results in a ﬁrm receiving a signal that induces it to apply
for leniency. The second bracketed term is also positive and is the indirect eﬀect
coming from increased usage of the leniency program due to a fall in the requisite
signal required to go to the CA: ∗  0. Given stronger prior beliefs that the
CA is aggressive, the signal that a ﬁrm must receive to induce it to apply for leniency
does not have to be as supportive of the CA having a convincing case.
In assessing the impact of a more aggressive CA, it is important to recognize a
feedback eﬀect that arises in how the prosecution and pre-emption eﬀects interact.
A more aggressive CA enhances the prosecution eﬀect which makes, say, ﬁrm 1 more
inclined to apply for leniency because it thinks it is more likely the CA will be able to
convict them without a ﬁrm in the leniency program. By the same argument, ﬁrm 1
realizes that a stronger prosecution eﬀect makes it more likely that ﬁrm 2 will apply;
hence, ﬁrm 1 is yet more inclined to apply because ﬁr m2i sm o r el i k e l yt od os o .
Again, ﬁrm 2 goes through the same calculus so ﬁrm 2 is more apt to apply because
13ﬁrm 1 is more apt to do so which makes ﬁrm 1 even more inclined to apply and so
forth. In this manner, there is a multiplier eﬀect from a more aggressive CA in that
it raises the prosecution eﬀect which then leads to a series of pre-emption eﬀects.
The preceding discussion suggests that a more aggressive CA should have an
increasing convex eﬀect on the probability of conviction. Numerical analysis is con-
ducted to explore this conjecture. Assume the following density function on a ﬁrm’s
signal  ∈ [01],
 (|)=2( 1− )+2( 2  − 1)
Recall that ﬁrms’ signals are independent conditional on .7 Note that  (|) is
increasing in  when 12 is the uniform density when  =1 2, and is decreasing










∈ {(01)(075)(251)}∈ {347}∈ {101190}
Figure 1 is when a strong CA convicts for sure ( =1 ) and a weak CA fails to
convict for sure ( =0 ). The probability of conviction is increasing and convex in the
prior probability that ﬁr m sa s s i g nt ot h eC Ab e i n gs t r o n g( ). It is also increasing in
the extent of leniency; note that the curves shift up for smaller values of .C o n s i d e r ,
for example,  = 5 A. 1 0r i s ei n from .2 to .3 increases the probability of conviction
by .135 (rising from .251 to .398), while an additional .10 rise in  from .3 to .4
increases the probability of conviction by .147 (as it rises to .553). The convexity is
yet more apparent when the strength of a strong CA is reduced to convicting with
probability .75 (Figure 2). Similar conclusions are drawn from Figure 3 which reports
when the strength of a weak CA is raised to convicting with probability .25.9 The
w a yi nw h i c ht h ep r e - e m p t i o ne ﬀect magniﬁes a rise in the prosecution eﬀect argues
to putting more resources into a competition authority after a leniency program is
instituted.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper has provided the ﬁrst analysis of the incentive eﬀects of leniency program
when former cartel members have private information about the likelihood that a
competition authority can convict. The presence of private information is compelling
and was shown to have a substantive eﬀect on how leniency program generate convic-
tions. A ﬁrm’s decision to apply for leniency is driven not only by concerns that the
competition authority has a strong case (prosecution eﬀect) but also with concerns
that its rival believes the competition authority has a strong case and thus will apply
(pre-emption eﬀect). The pre-emption eﬀect can cause ﬁrms to apply for sure when
7This density function is a generalization of an example suggested by Faruk Gul.
8If 
0 
00 then  (|
0) (|
00) is increasing in  and therefore satisﬁes the Monotone Likeli-
hood Ratio Property.
9The cases of  ∈ {34} are not reported as the probability of conviction is one for all  ∈
{19}
14the leniency program is suﬃciently generous, and can create a multiplier eﬀect with
a rise in the prosecution eﬀect.
The model formulated and investigated in this paper was very simple and, as a
result, there are a variety of ways in which to enrich it to tackle other issues related to
collusion and competition policy. Thus far, the analysis has focused on the incentives
to apply for leniency after a cartel has collapsed. By embedding this end game into
an inﬁnitely repeated game of collusion, one can assess how leniency programs -
when ﬁrms have private information - inﬂuence the decision to form a cartel and the
expected duration of the cartel. Previous theoretical research, beginning with Motta
and Polo (2003), has developed some understanding as to how leniency programs
destabilize cartels or, in some cases, stabilize them (Chen and Harrington, 2007).
How is that understanding changed when ﬁrms have private information when it
comes to deciding whether to apply for leniency?
In all previous work - including the current paper - the post-cartel environment is
static (or stationary) so that, in equilibrium, ﬁrms either apply for leniency immedi-
ately upon collapse of the cartel or never apply. In reality, the post-cartel environment
is far richer and more nuanced. A better description is that ﬁrms receive information
over time as to whether the competition authority will open an investigation and, if
they have already done so, the strength of the case. Firms are then engaged in a
multi-period game in which they receive signals according to some stochastic process
and update their beliefs over time. Now, a ﬁrm that decides not to apply for leniency
has an option value associated with applying later, at least as long as a rival does
not go to the competition authority in the meantime. Given that set-up, it would be
interesting to consider the strategic role of the competition authority in encouraging
ﬁrms to apply for leniency. The competition authority could also receive signals - in
the form of complaints and other forms of evidence - and can choose whether and
how to share them with the ﬁrms. More generally, it is worthwhile to engage in a
richer investigation of what instruments are available to the competition authority
and how it can best use them to enhance the pre-emption eﬀect and thereby make
leniency programs more eﬀective at producing convictions.
158A p p e n d i x A
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 . For this theorem to hold, it must be true that





[1 − Γ()]  0 ∀
Set Φ()=0and solve for  :





[1 − Γ()] = 0
 =
1+Γ() − 2Γ(){1 −  [|1 = 2 ≤ ]}
1+Γ()
≡  () ∈ (01)∀ ∈ ()
Since lim→ Γ()=0and lim→ Γ()=1then
lim
→ ()=1  lim
→
 ()= [|1 = ]  0
which is positive by A1. Hence,











Φ()  0 ∀ ∈ [0 ())
Deﬁning
0 ≡ min{ (): ∈ []} ∈ (01)
then




P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 . With public signals, the Pareto-eﬃcient equilibrium has
ﬁrms not applying for leniency when  [|1 2]  .I f  [|1 =  2 = ] 
then the event,  [|1 2]  , occurs with positive probability. Therefore, the
probability of leniency usage and the probability of conviction are both less than one.
The next step is to provide suﬃcient conditions for the unique equilibrium with
private signals to involve ﬁrms applying for leniency for all signals, in which case the
probability of leniency usage and the probability of conviction both equal one. The
unique equilibrium has ﬁrms always applying for leniency iﬀ





[1 − Γ()]  0 ∀ (15)
16As an intermediate step, let us show that  [|1 = 2 ≤ ] is increasing in  Let
 be the cdf on a ﬁrm’s signal
 [|1 = 2 ≤ ]=
Z 







[|1 = 2 ≤ ]



























Since [|1 = 2]1  0 then [|1 = 2 ≤ ]  0 if















 [|1 = 2 = ] −
Z 







which is true since  [|1 = 2] is increasing in 2.
Assume
 ∈ ( [|1 =  2 = ][|1 = 2 ≤ ]) (16)
By continuity and that  [|1 = 2 ≤ ] is increasing in , there exists unique




¯ ¯1 = 0 2 ≤ 0¤
−  =0 
It follows that Φ()  0 ∀ ≥ 0 To prove (15), we then need to show:





[1 − Γ()]  0 ∀ 0 (17)
G i v e nt h i se x p r e s s i o ni si n c r e a s i n gi n [|1 = 2 ≤ ] and  [|1 = 2 ≤ ] is
increasing in  then a lower bound is





[1 − Γ()] (18)
Since, by assumption  [|1 =  2 = ]−0 (18) is decreasing in Γ().D e ﬁne
e  =a r g m a x
∈[0]
Γ() (19)
and note that Γ(e )  1. Hence, a lower bound to (19) is achieved by replacing Γ()
with Γ(e ) Thus, a suﬃcient condition for (17) to be true is












 [|1 =  2 = ]+
1 − Γ(e )
1+Γ(e )
 (21)
As  [|1 =  2 = ]  1 and the RHS is a convex combination of  [|1 =  2 = ]
a n d1 ,t h e nt h eR H Se x c e e d s [|1 =  2 = ]. Hence, if
 ∈
µ





 [|1 =  2 = ]+
1 − Γ(e )
1+Γ(e )
¶
then (17) is true, which implies the unique equilibrium with private signals has le-
niency and conviction with probability one.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3 . First note that
 [|1 = ]= [|1 = 2 ≤ ]
from which it follows that
Φ() =  [|1 = ] − 0
Therefore,  =  is an equilibrium with private signals, and leniency is never used.
For public signals, since  [|1 = 2 = ] then leniency is used for a positive
measure of signals for all equilibria.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m4 . If ∗ ∈ () then
∆() ≥ 0 as  ≥ ∗
and, generically,
∆() T 0 as  T ∗ ∈ [∗ − 1] for some 0
By the diﬀerentiability of ∆(),t h i si m p l i e s∆(∗)  0 Take the total deriva-




















































































































 Hence, the second term in (22) is
non-negative.
Using (13), consider









































































and, after performing some manipulations,

½
(|1 = 2 ≤ )

¾













Therefore, (22) is positive.
9A p p e n d i x B
First note that
Γ()=P r( 2 ≤ |1 = )=P r( 2 ≤ |1 = )+P r
¡
2 ≤ |1 = 
¢
 (23)
Given ﬁrms’ signals are conditionally independent then
Pr(2 ≤ |1 = )=P r( |1 = )Pr(2 ≤ |) (24)
Inserting (24) into (23),





















































19Next, let us derive
 [|1 = 2 ≤ ]=P r( |1 = 2 ≤ ) +[ 1− Pr(|1 = 2 ≤ )]
Given
Pr(1 = 2 ≤ )=P r( )Pr(1 = |)Pr(2 ≤ |)
and
















Pr(|1 = 2 ≤ )=
Pr(1 = 2 ≤ )
Pr(1 = 2 ≤ )
=
Pr()Pr(1 = |)Pr(2 ≤ |)















 [|1 = 2 ≤ ]=
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Figure 3, ρ = (0.25, 1)
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